One of the great
joys of being a generalist is that I no longer feel the need to read articles
and attend presentations in "my field" if I think they're
boring.
Example: During
graduate school and in my early years at CBC, before I had made the thorough
transition from "specialist"
and "scholar" to "generalist" and "teacher," I
would go to conferences and attend the most brain-numbingly boring panels
merely because they were in my
"field," which, at that time, was the history of the American West,
Native Americans, and the environment.
Now my
"field" is simply history (US and World, any and all topics) and, of
course, teaching history. So when I went
to "the OAH" (the Organization of American Historians' annual
conference) in Milwaukee last weekend, I did not feel compelled to attend
panels that sounded boring.
On Friday afternoon,
I gleefully opted to pass by a panel on "Studies of Three Hydroelectric
Dams in Washington State" (which I would have dutifully attended in the
past because it was my field) in favor of a roundtable discussion on "The Warfare
State since the Vietnam War."
The simultaneous
expansion of the "warfare state" (think "military industrial
complex") and the "welfare state" (think Social Security,
Medicare, Veterans Benefits--the concept that the federal government has an
obligation to promote the "general welfare" through various social
programs) in the post 1945 period is a major theme in my History 148 course (US
since 1945). I thought to myself, I
should go to this panel. The expansion
of the warfare state is my field!
Well--I was very
glad I went. The presentations were
engaging and thought-provoking, which, frankly, is not common at academic
conferences. I scribbled pages of notes,
asked a couple questions, and stayed afterwards to talk to the luminaries on
the panel.
The panel was
focused specifically on the expansion of the warfare state, but it occurred to
me that you cannot deal with that development without linking it to the growth
of the welfare state. There are obvious
connections between the two: programs like the GI Bill, for example, serve the
purposes of both the warfare state and the welfare state. The expansion of the higher education (and
universities as a nexus of government and corporate research) is another
obvious link, promoting individual opportunity, economic development, and
bolstering the warfare state at the same time.
Even the Manhattan Project, which was clearly part of the warfare state,
served "welfare state" ends, promoting jobs and economic development
in communities like Los Alamos and the Tri-Cities (a nice local example that
John Findlay and Bruce Hevly talk about in their book "Atomic Frontier
Days").
Anyway, here are
some compelling insights from the panel (nothing new, but good thoughts
nonetheless)
1. The warfare state
(military spending) has been largely immune from the rising-tide of
conservative anti-government rhetoric.
Military budgets have expanded dramatically without protest from
small-government, deficit-hawk conservatives, who seemingly have never seen a
defense-spending program they don't like (Ron Paul is one of the few exceptions
to this). And this had been true of the
larger American public, who, in one poll, give a 67% favorability rating to the
American military but only a 22% favorability rating to the "federal
government" generally, which is criticized for being bloated, inefficient,
and intrusive.
Why is this so? Why have Americans been so unyielding their
support for the growth and expansion of the warfare state in the post Vietnam
era (and indeed in the entire post 1945 period)?
One answer is that
politicians have cynically or unwittingly engaged in "threat
inflation," playing upon the fears and insecurities of the American people
(this has certainly been the case in the post 9/11 period where our military
establishment has expanded exponentially while the world, arguably, has become
a much safer place).
Another answer is
that the post-Vietnam all-volunteer military establishment has offered seeming
protection from these manifold global threats while at the same time asking
very little of most Americans (no extra taxes; no conscription). It's a great deal! They keep us safe and we (American civilians)
sacrifice very little. (Of course, this will have to change, given our looming
deficits.)
2. The structural
change to an all-volunteer army (moving away from conscription) has helped to
foster the expansion of the warfare state.
It is interesting to
note that Richard Nixon voiced support for ending the draft in 1968 because he
felt that it would help bring an end to anti-draft rioting (which he conflated
with anti-war protest generally) while at the same time peace protestors believed
that ending the draft would make America less likely to go to war.
Richard Nixon was
more correct than the peace protestors.
It is a great irony of modern American history that our move to an
all-volunteer army, a move so much advocated by anti-war protestors, has dulled criticisms against the growth and
expansion of the warfare state. Without
the draft, citizens have less investment in large questions of war and peace.
On a related note,
fewer of our current politicians now have actually served in the military than
in previous decades, and this lack of experience may influence their decisions
concerning the use and withholding of troops--the panelists suggested that politicians
with no military experience might actually be more likely, not less, to deploy
troops.
3. The move to an all-volunteer force has also
escalated the costs of the warfare state, since the need to recruit and retain
military personnel has necessitated increasing salaries and benefits.
I would argue that
most Americans see the warfare state as just another arm of the welfare state:
it provides jobs and keeps us safe. It's
popular. And the wars are distant and
non-intrusive. And the taxes are still low (so far). And until now, American have not really had
to choose between spending on the military and spending on social
programs, guns and butter
Anyway, my students
this quarter are hearing a lot about the relationship between the warfare state
and the welfare state, guns and butter.
Sometimes you learn
things at conferences. Or at least think
about things in new ways.